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Abstract 
This chapter explores the reasons why organised crime offenders use violence. Using a multi-
faceted framework, it examines the phenomenon from macro and micro perspectives across 
levels of formality and fluidity. Utilising theories of violence which map across psychological, 
sociological and cultural perspectives as well as instrumental and expressive explanations, it 
examines international empirical evidence associated with longstanding hierarchical groups, 
such as the Costra Nostra and Yakuza. From then on, the chapter examines 4109 UK based 
organised crime offenders, comparing them with cohorts of both serious and general 
offenders. It examines residential community dynamics as well as the early experiences and 
behaviour of young men thought to be on the periphery of organised crime. As the studies 
become more detailed and illuminating, the chapter concludes that a ‘one-size fits all’ 






Although a myriad of definitions exist for Serious Organised Crime (SOC), Albanese (2007) 
found the four most frequent characteristics to be: a continuing organizational hierarchy; the 
corruption of public officials to maintain immunity; obtaining rational profit through crime; 
and the use of force or threat. This chapter explores the latter, specifically focusing upon the 
currency of violence for those engaged in this environment. To do so this chapter will examine 
the role of violence across a spectrum of organised crime groups (OCG), starting with the 
earlier studies on more formal hierarchical groups, such as the Costra Nostra and Yakuza. It 
will then turn to the UK, initially looking at a study of 4109 offenders, before looking in more 
depth at Organised Crime Group (OCG) dynamics and the views of the community. Finally, 
the chapter examines the characteristics of a cohort of young men, identified as being on the 
periphery of organised crime to establish early experiences. During this process psychological, 
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sociological and cultural perspectives will be considered, together with an analysis of 
instrumental and expressive explanations. In doing so it will ultimately argue that a multitude 
of explanations for violence are necessary to account for the diversity found within OCGs.  
 
At the outset some foundations need to be laid. It is widely agreed that SOC creates a 
significant level of negative impact to society. This is observed at a macro level, with high level 
corruption associated with failed states and severe financial cost (Home Office, 2018), and 
also at a micro level, where widespread community fear and harm can be generated (Bullock 
et al., 2009). Unfortunately, defining its form has proved difficult, being reported as “one of 
the most contested terms in academic criminology” (Sheptyki, 2003, p. 490). Much of the 
reason behind this has rested on the methodology used to identify and understand organised 
crime. There are distinct challenges associated with researching this type of violent and covert 
crime, which often means that academics rely upon law enforcement organisations to 
generate data. The quality of this may be influenced by the capacity and capability of the 
agencies themselves, as some offenders will be noticed whilst others remain invisible (Kirby, 
2013). Further, as no country routinely categorises information on organised crime offences 
or its offenders, no international comparative data is available. This limits the data in terms 
of representativeness and objectivity, leading to the criticism that the frequency and content 
of organised crime is poorly understood (von Lampe, 2012).  
 
Nonetheless, it is important to have a definition to guide this chapter. In the UK, where the 
definition has evolved over recent years, it is explained as, “individuals planning, coordinating 
and committing serious offences, whether individuals, in groups and / or as part of 
transnational networks” (Home Office, 2018, p. 11). Meanwhile, the United Nations defined 
OCGs as a “structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting 
in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences in order to 
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (United Nations Centre for 
International Crime Prevention, 2000, pp. 48-49).  
 
Research on the structure of Organised Crime Groups also generates diverse findings. Whilst 
some view  “….crimes as very well organised” there are others who “see crimes as 
intermittently or more regularly networked, but not in any stable hierarchy” (Levi, 2012, p. 
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598). Indeed, the United Nations sought to describe Organised Crime Groups through five 
typologies. The “standard hierarchy” (UNCIP, 2000, p. 75), also referred to as type 1, is aligned 
with Cressey’s (1969) work on La Cosa Nostra in the USA (Finckenauer, 2005). This type of 
OCG is characterized by the reliance on violence, to achieve criminal goals and maintain 
internal discipline (UNCIP, 2000). Their aims are facilitated through: a rigid leadership; 
hierarchical structure; a strong group identity; governance of identifiable territory; and the 
use of corruption, racketeering and violence. However, whilst Sheptycki et al. (2011) points 
to an apparent increase in type 1 OCGs across Mexico and South America, this model appears 
less common than the ‘enterprise model’ (Smith, 1991), where profit is obtained through a 
series of linked criminal acts forged through the ability to engender fresh contacts. In this 
latter model, Standing (2003) and Sheptycki et al. (2011, p. 12) explain “the practices are more 
linked with local opportunities, deregulation or change of laws than with a strong 
organization…challenging the state”. Finckenauer (2005, p. 65), further explains, “what we 
more commonly see are loosely affiliated networks of criminals who coalesce around certain 
criminal opportunities. The structure of these groups is much more amorphous, free floating, 
and flatter, and thus lacking in a rigid hierarchy”. Hobbs (1998), concurs pointing out that 
transnational organized crime merely comprises local groups who interact to engage in 
serious crime across borders. This leaves us with a varied understanding of Organised Crime, 
facilitated through a diverse range of structures. At one end of the continuum the boundaries 
are blurred, epitomised by shady business practice, whilst at the other end they morph into 
more locally based street gangs, who traffic drugs and other commodities, across regional 
boundaries. However, notwithstanding these definitional challenges a general view exists 
that SOC is increasing (Brocklesby, 2012); a premise that has been objectively verified in the 
UK’s Organised Crime Group mapping project - an initiative that will be described later 
(National Crime Agency, 2018).  
 
It is also pertinent to point out that a definition of violence is also contested. Iadicola and 
Shupe (2003, p. 23) explain, “violence is any action or structural arrangement that results in 
physical or nonphysical harm to one or more persons”. This wide definition includes all 
levels of interpersonal, institutional and structural harm generated by individuals and the 
society they inhabit. Hawdon (2014) disregards this wider interpretation and (as we do in 
this chapter) focuses on physical force, including threats and attempts. However, the 
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discussion continues to be nuanced with some questioning whether the violence used by a 
member of an organised crime group should be labelled as interpersonal or collective 
violence. Senechal de la Roche (2001) argues that collective violence can only be reported 
when one of the parties can attract allies, and these allies are socially close to their own 
group and socially distant from the other group. This process is enhanced when the groups 
enjoy solidarity, intimacy, cultural homogeneity, and interdependence (ibid). It is only when 
the violence involves members of the group, for the furtherance of the group, should it be 
considered collective. Finally, in this section, it is also useful to set out the distinction 
between instrumental and expressive violence. The former relates to violence instigated to 
deliver a specific purpose, whilst the latter is less goal oriented and more likely to deliver 
greater physical injury, as it is conducted for intrinsic pleasure or gratification (McDevitt et 
al., 2002). Topali (2006) interviewing violent offenders highlighted the positive emotions 
gleaned from this aggressive behaviour. This understanding is supported by cultural 
criminologists, who assert that some individuals living mundane and risk averse lives, 
engage in crime and violence for the pleasure it delivers (Katz 1988; Lyng, 1990). 
 
Having outlined some theoretical perspectives, the chapter will now explore the currency of 
violence, concentrating on the three specific areas mentioned earlier. The section on the 
Costra Nostra and Yakuza comes from archived data whilst information in relation to UK 
Organised Crime Groups emanates from previous research studies conducted by the 
authors. Readers will also observe that the information relating to each example becomes 
progressively more detailed, as the groups themselves run from structured hierarchies to 
more enterprise based and less organised networks.  
 
Hierarchical organised crime groups: The Costra Nostra and Yakuza 
 
Structured, hierarchical and mass criminal organisations have been found across the globe, 
including La Eme in Mexico, the triad in China, and the Russian Mafia. These groups form for 
the purpose of making money illegally (Maran, 2008), and are sustained through their ability 
to adapt to new opportunities in illegal markets (Hill, 2004). This particular section will focus 
on the Costra Nostra and Yakuza. 
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The emergence of mafias have often been explained using a sociological backdrop as they 
are said to “.. emerge in societies that are undergoing a sudden and late transition to the 
market economy, lack[ing] a legal structure that reliably protects… disputes” (Varese, 2011, 
p. 193), and this can be seen in the Costra Nostra and the Yakuza. The former can be traced 
back to 1838 (Paoli, 2003) and “was not created with criminal intent in mind. It started as an 
‘alternative’ form of local government” (Maran, 2008, p. 31), although evolved into the 
murderous / sophisticated organisation apparent today (Dickie, 2004). The Costra Nostra, 
was built on close bonds, often bound by family, where members are “strongly bonded and 
secretly orientated” (Cayli, 2010, p. 387), and where betrayal was deemed unforgivable 
(Bolzoni, 2008). The organisation had a strict and hierarchical structure. Soldiers exist at the 
base of the pyramid, each of whom belong to a family (Jamieson, 2000). These small 
families are coordinated by a capodecina, who in turn are led by an elected capo (ibid, 
2000). Violence is reported as a critical element of the operation as it deters members who 
consider disloyalty, whilst also generate compliance from those who are being extorted.   
 
The Yakuza emerged slightly later, in the 1920s and 30s, although appeared less concerned 
with secrecy (Kaplan & Dubro, 2003). They were said to celebrate their success and endorse 
films that depicted, “Japanese crime bosses as benevolent patriarchs and a positive force in 
society” (Sheptycki, 2008, p. 24). Indeed, “after gang wars, feuding leaders have [apologized] 
to the public for any inconvenience caused” (Kaplan & Dubro, 2003, p. xviii). They comprise 
“more than 80,000 regular or associate Yakuza gang members” (Shikata, 2006, p. 416; 
Calderon, 2012), being based on a family structure incorporating a “unique Japanese 
relationship known as oyabun-kobun [father-son],… providing advice, protection, and help in 
return receiving unswerving loyalty” (Kaplan & Dubro, 2003, p. 8). At the top of the Yamaguchi 
pyramid is the godfather (syndicate leader), followed by four shatei (younger brothers), and 
eight wakashira-hosa (assistant young leaders). Under them can be found other tiers including 
one executive, eighty three wakashu (young men), each of whom commanded his own legion 
of kobun (children) (2003). Kaplan and Dubro highlight the “remarkable strength and 
cohesion, leading at times to a fanatic devotion to the boss” (2003, p. 8).  
 
Both the Costra Nostra and Yakuza have been known to infiltrate public and private 
organisations, in particular the judiciary, politicians and law enforcement, to extend their 
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social influence and offer wider protection (Dickie, 2004), under the “protective umbrella of 
the state bureaucrats and politicians” (Cayli, 2010, p. 402). Indeed, the Yakuza are said to 
fund and support political candidates who reciprocate with political favours (Adelstein, 
2010). More relevant to this chapter is that both organisations are infamous for their use of 
violence (Maran, 2008). The Cosa Nostra, for example, “….survived and prospered because 
it intimidated witnesses, and confounded or corrupted the police and courts” (Dickie, 2004, 
p. 3). Further, this reputation for violence generate significant income streams for the 
Costra Nostra through ‘protection money’ (Dickie, 2004). This approach was replicated by 
the Yakuza, who focused especially on the entertainment sector (Iwai, 1963), receiving 
protection money from, “restaurants, bars, night-clubs, and sex industry” (Hill, 2003, p. 95). 
Interestingly although extremely effective in their homelands both the Cosa Nostra and 
Yakuza failed to significantly extend their influence outside their native states (Hill, 2002).  
 
Early research on hierarchical groups, like the Costra Nostra and Yakuza, emphasized the 
organization and discipline between the tiers of management. Violence was therefore 
legitimized through a logical process and viewed as instrumental, as it served a tangible 
purpose in delivering group aims. Unlike shady, but legitimate, business practice, organised 
crime offenders are unable to avail themselves of legal protection, nor do they have a 
supporting pension plan. This means violence and intimidation can be interpreted as a 
means to achieve a specific goal (Wieviorka, 2009), such as obtaining money through the 
use of threats. In this context it is often depicted as an instrumental and impersonal act, 
understood within the social norms of the actors involved (both perpetrators and victims). 
 
The UK position 
 
From here the chapter will explore the situation in the UK, through previous research findings 
of the authors. It should be highlighted that UK Organised Crime Groups are generally 
reported to be less structured and hierarchical than the Costra Nostra and Yakuza. Of course, 
as mentioned earlier, a significant methodological challenge exists in the ability to identify 
organised crime offenders, as no country maintains a criminal database, that captures all SOC 
offenders. In an attempt to rectify this gap, the Home Office commissioned a study (see 
Francis et al. 2013; Kirby et al., 2016), to extract a population of SOC offenders from the UK 
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offender database (Police National Computer), over a three-year period. To separate SOC 
offenders from others in the database three criteria were used: first, the individual had 
committed a specific organised crime (suitable offences were designated through a peer 
assessed process); second, the crime was committed with a co-offender; and third, it was 
viewed a serious crime – depicted by a custodial sentence of three years or more. A sample 
of 4109 organised crime offenders were extracted, together with two comparison groups: a 
general crime group (n = 4090), who were aligned with none of the criteria; and a serious 
crime offender group (n = 4109), who had previously received a custodial sentence of three 
years or more, but were not convicted with a co-offender nor for a specified organised crime 
offence. 
 
The subsequent analysis generated a number of insights. The organised crime offenders 
comprised a tiny proportion of the overall offender database (0.2%), with a mean prior 
conviction rate of 22 sanctions. This placed them as a more recidivist group than the general 
crime offenders, but less than the serious crime offenders (mean 27 sanctions). The SOC and 
serious crime offenders were also more likely to be male (95%) than general offenders (78%) 
(x2, p< 0.001), and older. Whilst the modal age at the time of the inclusion offence was 27 
years, for organised crime offenders, the modal age for 'serious crime’ and ‘general’ offenders 
was 21 and 20 years respectively. The sample also included more non-UK nationals (14%) than 
the serious (9%) and general (10%) categories (x2 p< 0.001), which is higher than the 11.4% 
level of foreign-born individuals within the UK population at that time (Rienzo & Vargas-Silva, 
2013). 
 
As such, the UK organised crime offender is predominantly a non-adolescent male, a 
significant number of whom are early onset and persistent offenders, with a prior conviction 
history dominated by drug offences (73%), (serious crime offenders showed 19% and general 
crime offenders 10% drug sanctions). In fact, convictions for violence was more common with 
serious (26%) and general crime (34%) groups, than SOC offenders (9%), as were acquisitive 
crimes (robbery, burglary and theft), which featured much less in organised crime offender 




Answering this question is assisted by two other supplementary studies both of which were 
assisted by the Organised Crime Group Mapping (OCGM) project. This initiative requests all 
police agencies in England and Wales to identify and calculate a threat score for OCGs 
resident in their local area (Tusikov, 2012). Over the past decade this has allowed the UK to 
provide a more accurate analysis on approximately 5,800 OCGs containing 40,000 active 
offenders (Home Office, 2013). Using  data from one police force, Kirby and Snow (2016) 
examined the characteristics of 15 OCGs, each containing between three and fifteen 
members (n = 99). The OCGM requests police forces categorise offenders into three groups: 
principal members (who direct the group); significant members (who perform a critical role 
in implementing the crime and are closely linked to the principal members); and peripheral 
members (who are supplementary and transitory members, not involved in the planning). In 
this sample there were 20 principal, 42 significant, and 37 peripheral members and further 
analysis highlighted two specific findings. First, even within these less established enterprise 
models of offending it is possible to distinguish tiers of influence or hierarchy within the 
OCG. Secondly, even though the vast majority of offenders had prior convictions it was the 
peripheral members who were most aligned with violence. In subsequent practitioner 
interviews it was thought peripheral members were more dispensable and could be hired to 
conduct enforcement duties due to their reputation for violence. Baumeister (1999) argues 
some groups designate specific individuals as responsible for the violence, which separates 
them from the groups decision makers, and this process was apparent here. 
 
The other study highlights the aura of intimidation that a reputation for violence can bring. 
Again using the OCGM, Kirby et al. (2017) completed the first survey of citizens who reside in 
areas where Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) are known to proliferate, and compare these 
with a control group (n = 431). There were few demographic differences across the 
communities (i.e. age, number in household, settled residence, deprivation scores). However, 
those living in the ‘OCG’ locations were more likely to report low collective efficacy and 
generally thought their neighbours were least likely to intervene when faced with a crime in 
action. In contrast, those within the control site showed higher indicators of collective efficacy 
(trust, engagement with other residents) and also reported their fellow residents to be more 
likely to take action and inform the police about minor incidents of crime and disorder. 
However when asked about drug dealing and offences involving SOC, the control group 
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respondents no longer reported their residents as more likely to intervene. Whilst the survey 
did not glean an explanation for the change in behaviour when facing SOC as opposed to low 
level crime, other commentators’ have previously highlighted the impact of explicit and 
implicit OCG intimidation on the community (Crocker et al., 2017). Indeed, this research 
shows that some locations (where OCGs proliferate), are consistently less likely to contact 
public authority figures, or challenge crime - what Corkrean (2013) referred to as a conflict 
community. As such, the ability of the police to obtain information or gain cooperation from 
the public in reducing organised crime and violence may be in part dependent on the location.  
 
Young men on the periphery of organised crime 
 
In completing this picture, the chapter now investigates the characteristics of young people 
who practitioners believe have the potential to become the next generation of SOC offenders. 
It is hoped analysis at this early stage will provide insights not noticed in more mature 
offenders. As these young men were found to predominantly socialise and offend within 
groups, it is useful to consider the term ‘gang’ in more detail.  
 
Whilst some see gang membership as an evolutionary process into SOC, others view it as a 
completely different concept (Esbensen et al., 2001). Again, ‘gang’ definitions are contested. 
The Eurogang Network stated that ‘a street gang (or troublesome youth group corresponding 
to a street gang elsewhere) is any durable, street-oriented youth group whose identity 
includes involvement in illegal activity’ (see Wood and Alleyne, 2010). In the UK, Hales et al. 
(2006) demonstrated different types of gang or crew. The first are close friendship groups, 
which offer safety in numbers. Secondly, there are associates who are all known to each 
other, live in close proximity and engage in criminality together. Finally, there is the criminal 
crew and the organised crime network, which both engage in more serious criminality 
including local and national drug markets. Sharp et al. (2006) prefer the term delinquent 
youth groups. These involve young people who spend a lot of time in public places in groups 
of three or more and have engaged in delinquent or criminal behaviour over the last 12 
months. They are also said to have at least one structural feature (either a name, an area, a 
leader, or rules). There appear tangible differences between US and UK gang forms, with the 
former being more endemic and organised. However, like the UK, street gangs appear more 
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territorial, dominated by working class males, focusing their violence on rival gang members. 
Gang members also have more autonomy, either acting alone to commit crime, or offending 
in groups when further numbers are needed.  
 
Explanations for the formation of street gangs have often been associated with changes in 
wider society, such as increased competition for employment, economic contraction and 
immigration, social exclusion, poor education, and fragmentation of communities (see Klein 
and Maxson, 2006). Extending this perspective, cultural criminologists also highlight the need 
for kinship and purpose supported by rituals and symbols in the form of gang colours, tattoos, 
and graffiti. These sociological explanations are underpinned by psychological perspectives. 
The research by Tajfel and Turner (Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & 
Reynolds, 2010), on social identity theory, argued people identify themselves with those they 
feel similar, whilst  distancing themselves from those they feel dissimilar. They attribute their 
own group (in-group) with positive attributes whilst bestowing less positive attributes to 
others (out-group) to maintain self-esteem. This emotional connection within the in-group 
can mitigate individual responsibility and influence conformity to group norms. It can also 
generate discordance and prejudice against out-groups, whose members become 
depersonalized (Tajfel, 1974; 1981).  
 
Kennedy observes that gang members are disproportionately violent when compared to 
other types of offenders. The dynamic of a gang inherently means allegiance to one group 
and hostility to others. However, he points out that the most serious violence is only 
associated with a small number of gang members. His study of gun related homicide in 
Boston found 61 groups accounted for 60% of homicides relating to those under 21 years – 
just 0.3% of the city’s population (Kennedy et al., 1996; Kennedy et al., 2001), and points 
out this is similar in Cincinatti and Los Angeles. However, he argues that in each gang the 
members who are most likely to instigate and facilitate the most extreme violence account 
for 0.04%, or less of the population (Kennedy, 2001). Unfortunately, being associated in 
areas where violence is so prevalent creates a downward spiral. Papachristos (2011), 
highlights the risk by pointing out that at one period, whilst the US homicide rate was 5 per 
100,000 in some parts of Chicago, it was 3,000 in every 100,000. He argued this meant 
walking around certain US neighbourhoods was statistically riskier than activating a 
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landmine in an Afghanistan war zone. Faced with this reality, gang membership brings a 
multitude of benefits, such as: credibility, protection, kinship and lifestyle. This sense of 
belonging is sustained by tattoos, initiation ceremonies, symbols and kinship. However the 
cost of maintaining street credibility is violently confronting signs of disrespect, which in 
turn leads to reoccurring retaliatory action.  
 
Having set out this context we can turn to our UK cohort of ‘at risk’ young men. The project 
was located in the conurbations of a large UK city and supported by data from the OCGM 
project and information from the police, local authority and schools. The purpose of the 
project was to engage with these young people in an attempt to divert them into a more 
legitimate lifestyle. They were initially identified through familial, or other close relationships 
with OCGs, albeit this was later supplemented by the use of other risk factors. Initially, many 
of the young people refused to engage with the process, although the eventual cohort 
involved 22 young people between 13 and 18 years (mean 15.18 years), of which 15 (68.2%) 
of these were recorded as previous crime victims. All individuals were highlighted on police 
databases as being on the periphery of organised crime, having between 0-7 prior convictions. 
Their criminal histories encompassed various offending behaviour, although mostly for 
violence. Sanctions included: assault (77%, n = 24), burglary (67%, n = 21), and criminal 
damage (51%, n = 16), with one case of murder and three cases of sexual assault. Once 
agreeing to take part, all of the individuals were paired with a lead professional (often a 
specialist youth worker) who provided them with tailored advice in an effort to assist them 
into education or employment. All the young males often socialised with other  troublesome 
youths and engaged in a wide level of aggressive behaviour in their locality. The practitioners 
who worked alongside them highlighted both sociological and psychological factors, 
facilitating their pathway into SOC.  
 
“They all lived on the same estate. […] Those estates are creating crime because you 
have the worst families from all over and putting them in the one estate. Multiple 
generations who have been on [welfare]benefits and smoked and drank and that is 
the only thing the young people have known.”……..“The only people they know who 
actually have anything are drug dealers. Everyone else is poor. They want more. They 
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see dealers in their Audi A3 and their Nikes. We all want it, but the only way they see 
to get it, is crime” (P7). 
 
“Some kids don’t have any food in the house. There’s no electricity. So they rather 
hang around on the streets. Then they start selling bits and bobs. A bit of weed 
[cannabis]. Gets them enough money to buy some food from the chippy [fast food 
takeaway]. Where would you rather be? In a cold house, sleeping on a mattress or on 
the streets with the lads and you’ve had a portion of fish and chips. […] The older 
ones will see that, see the vulnerability. He’ll do it. He’ll move that. He’ll hide the gun.  
[…]  A £100 to you who has got a job and can see a future, is nothing. £100 to 
someone who has nothing, wow. Millionaire for a day” (P1).  
 
Of course, not all young men on these estates became involved in crime or gangs. 
Psychological explanations serve to explain the difference between these and other young 
people who lived in the area. Specifically, the youths in the cohort exhibited a higher 
preponderance of risk factors and lack of protective factors. 
  
“There was five that we worked with consistently. One had a dad in jail. one – dad 
passed away. Another – dad was street homeless in town. The other one’s dad was 
not there..” (P6). 
 
“Things happen in their community. Stabbings. Shootings. In their street. It has 
become the norm in this city. No one knows how this will have affected them in later 
life yet. They could be traumatised. I think they will be” (P1). 
 
Further, a qualitative difference could be observed across the young people within the cohort. 
Whilst some played a leadership role others appeared content to be led. Similarly, as Kennedy 
observed, certain individuals were at the forefront of using gratuitous and extreme violence. 
One youth worker reported talking to one of the young people outside his house when the 
conversation turned to his parents. At this point he became very aggressive and lashed out at 
his father’s car, smashing windows, tail lights and tearing off the mirrors. Police intelligence 
 13 
on the same individual showed his extreme unpredictability and his willingness to be at the 
forefront of any confrontation.  
 
Discussion: The currency of violence 
 
In attempting to better understand the currency of violence in organised crime this chapter 
makes four specific points.  
 
First, the obvious starting position for any discussion on this subject would be to set out the 
level of violence associated with SOC. However this cannot be done with any accuracy for a 
number of reasons. The concepts of both organised crime and violence are contested with 
no agreed definition for either. This issue is further hindered due to the reliance on law 
enforcement agencies to provide much of the data on which both concepts are measured. 
As such, significant elements of organised crime and violence remains invisible to the 
researcher.  Whilst the introduction of the OCGM in the UK has assisted significantly it still 
remains the case that data surrounding OCGs, and the violence surrounding it, is 
incomplete. However, some information is available and it is on this basis that this 
discussion goes forward. 
 
Second, whilst it is clear that violence plays a core role in organised crime it is more difficult 
to provide unambiguous theoretical perspectives which explains the phenomenon. 
Sociological perspectives are useful in that they turn our attention to the wider environment 
in which organised crime occurs. The Costra Nostra and Yakuza emerged from the social 
turmoil of their region, implementing a systematic and structured approach to secure 
power. Similarly, the UK OCGM project highlights organised crime is more likely to emerge 
in areas of deprivation, a finding also replicated in street gangs. Therefore most gang 
members tend to emerge from deprived and challenging urban environments where 
violence is used as a currency to generate respect, influence and credibility. Cultural 
approaches extend this understanding, explaining how OCGs and gangs generate kinship 
and a sense of purpose for their members. For socially excluded individuals, the social 
norms of the street become dominant and provide a sense of purpose that mainstream 
society cannot fulfil.  
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Nonetheless, these accounts cannot explain why some community members can resist 
criminal involvement, or why some offenders exert greater influence within their groups. 
Indeed, the research shows a certain level of hierarchy in all organised crime groups and this 
is most clearly illustrated in the Costra Nostra, Yakuza, Triads and Mafia (Arsovska & Craig, 
2006).  Here the structure is clear and pyramidal, with leaders at the top, followed by 
middle tier managers, and soldiers at the base. In contrast, whilst not as structured, distinct 
roles are also evident in the UK OCGs, labelled as principal, significant and peripheral 
members, with practitioners arguing the latter were the most likely to be used as enforcers. 
These differences are best explained by individual characteristics and learned experiences, 
which will be discussed further below. However, in essence sociological, psychological and 
cultural explanations all assist in providing a wider understanding as to why violent 
behaviour is core to SOC.  
 
Third, this type of nuanced explanation assists when analyzing instrumental and expressive 
accounts of violence. Put simply, violence associated with organised crime has been 
previously reported as instrumental, and street gang violence as expressive (Hughes & Short 
2005; Papachristos, 2009). However, others argue these terms are difficult to separate and 
often co-occur, as violence leading to tangible goals can also generate wider pleasures 
through the exercise of power and dominance (Levi & Maguire, 2004, p. 811). Similarly, 
expressive retaliatory actions (Anderson, 1990; Bourgois, 2003) may also be aligned to a 
more abstract purpose. For example, whilst simple actions of disrespect can be resolved 
without violence, doing so may be viewed as a sign of weakness within the norms of street 
culture and could possibly encourage further attacks. As gang members view themselves 
outside of mainstream society, they must organise their own protection, which may include 
pre-emptive action. Felson (2009), therefore argues that violence is always instrumental, as 
it is always instigated to achieve some level of gain. For example, if a member of the Costra 
Nostra or Yakuza face non-payment, would they view that behavior as a breach of a 
financial transaction or as a sign of disrespect? It is therefore difficult for the assailant, and 
even more so for the academic, to accurately identify all of the factors behind the assault. A 
disproportionate beating could be correctly categorised as expressive in one situation, 
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whilst in another context could be interpreted as a carefully planned action to act as a wider 
deterrent. 
 
Fourth, we see from previous research, that violence (or credible threat) is central to the 
business of SOC. However, interestingly we saw in the UK study that whilst violence is 
present in the offending history of organised crime offenders, this is to a lesser degree than 
other offender groups. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that inappropriate use of 
violence can be bad for business. Violence, especially when it generates collateral harm, can 
bring unwanted scrutiny from law enforcement agencies. This enhanced surveillance brings 
increased risk of detection to both the organised crime offender and those they do business 
with. Business partners require predictability in those they engage with, therefore 
unpredictable and unwarranted violence can also illustrate irrational decision making. 
Taking the UK example, it appears offenders with a reputation for being excessively violent 
are less likely to be the principal and more likely to be peripheral members used specifically 
to enforce operations.  
 
So where does this discussion leave us? The chapter argues that the reason both violence 
and organised crime are contested concepts is because they emerge in many different 
forms. Serious organised crime, whilst often referred to as a single crime genre, is in fact the 
culmination of many different crimes, conducted by many different types of people, in many 
different ways. Therefore if one definition cannot explain organised crime or violence, then 
it is perhaps unrealistic to expect we can fashion one explanation for the violence that exists 
within SOC. Nonetheless, these theoretical perspectives do not contradict each other, but 
assist in a more nuanced understanding. At a structural level, the social fabric, in terms of 
social change and deprivation, generate an environment from which violent organised crime 
offenders often emerge. The individual is then moulded by street level interactions through 
cultural norms and local contacts. In this developmental process, individuals forge more 
distinct characteristics and become less equal, having been born with different 
characteristics, which are advanced (positively or negatively) through life experiences. For a 
few of these adolescent ‘troublesome youths’ these experiential pathways will divert them 
into crime, and a few of these will become involved in organised crime, be they peripheral, 
significant, principal, soldier or capo members. 
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As such it is an amalgam of the environment they are born into, coupled with individual 
characteristics and learned experiences that influences an individual’s decision to use (and 
how to use) violence. This decision making has ramifications as it is closely aligned to how 
they will be viewed by their peers. When a decision to use violence is made it is the 
culmination of many (often subconscious) factors: individual propensity to use violence; 
capability and experience of the assailant to use violence; the individual character, 
capability and experience of the victim in defending themselves; the current context (both 
relating to the individuals and the group); the longer term relationship between the 
assailant and victim (both at individual and group levels); the ramifications of conducting or 
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